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Abstract
Correlated equilibria in strategic market games played, simultaneously,
by “overlapping generations” of players correspond to sunspot equilibria in
the associated, competitive economy. The lower the degree of competition,
the larger the range of parameters that allow for eﬀective correlation or
endogenous stochastic ﬂuctuations.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Extrinsic uncertainty has been extensively discussed in competitive equilibrium
theory and macroeconomic theory since the pioneering contributions of Azari-
adis (1981) and Cass and Shell (1983). Sunspot equilibria represent endogenous
stochastic ﬂuctuations in market economies, as cycles, in Benhabib and Day
(1982) or Grandmont (1985), represent endogenous deterministic ﬂuctuations.
Correlated equilibria for non-cooperative games, introduced by Aumann
(1974, 1987) bear an evident similarity with sunspot equilibria for competitive
markets and, no wonder, several have explored the possible connection between
these two notions 1.
Our purpose here is to study
1. the connection between correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium in
the simplest possible framework: an economy of overlapping generations
in which individuals are strategic 2;
1Maskin and Tirole (1987) considered a two-period, two-good, two-type model of an im-
perfectly competitive market and proved that extrinsic uncertainty can indeed aﬀect the equi-
librium, but only if there is imperfect correlation – neither perfect correlation nor complete
independence. Aumann, Peck and Shell (199?) constructed an example of an imperfectly cor-
related or sunspot equilibrium of a market game with two types of individuals. Forges (1991)
considered extensive, rather than strategic form correlated equilibria (Forges (1986, 1988)),
and proved that they coincide with sunspot equilibria for a market game with complete se-
curity markets (Postlewaite and Schmeidler, (1978), Peck, Shell and Spear (1992)). Peck and
Shell (1991) deﬁned sunspot-Nash equilibria in market games with state-contingent security
markets and proved that correlated equilibrium allocations are also sunspot-Nash equilibrium
allocations with vanishing trades in securities. Peck (1994) compared correlated and sunspot
equilibria using the models of Azariadis (1981) and Cass and Shell (1983). Forges and Peck
(1995) proved that the sunspot equilibria of a standard economy of overlapping generations
and the correlated equilibria of the multi-stage market game that mimics it are equivalent.
Davila (1999) considered correlated equilibria of a two-period, two-good, two-type economy as
in Maskin and Tirole (1987) and sunspot equilibria of a market game played by the associated
economy of overlapping generations and provided conditions under which the two coincide.
2Overlapping generations models with strategic agents have already been studied. Goenka,
Kelly and Spear (1998) studied complex and chaotic equilibrium dynamics as in Grandmont
(1985). Jacobsen (2000) considered imperfectly competitive cycles, while Heinemann (1997)
22. the extent to which the degree of competition aﬀects the possibility of
endogenous ﬂuctuations.
The strategic behavior of individuals or the imperfectly competitive structure
of markets we model as a market game, following Shapley (1976) or Shapley and
Shubik (1977). Importantly, the game is played simultaneously by a countable
inﬁnity of individuals or players, whose preferences and endowments parallel
the structure of an economy of overlapping generations of Samuelson (1958) 3;
this eliminates considerations of dynamic or extensive form strategic choice and
of reﬁnements, such as, subgame perfection. Forges (1991), in the concluding
remarks of her article, suggested the usefulness of this simple model for the
study of extrinsic uncertainty: “It could be worthwhile to investigate this model
or more sophisticated versions of it by studying the extensive form correlated
equilibria ... and by replicating the players to get results on the limit economy.”
Forges and Peck (1995) mentioned this game as well, and they suggested the
construction of the correlated equilibrium that we use here.
Azariadis (1981) used the simple model of overlapping generations and a
simple, two-state, stationary Markov process to show that the resulting equilib-
ria may be subject to extrinsic uncertainty; and he gave necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for the existence of a (non-trivial) two-state, stationary sunspot equi-
librium. Here we construct a correlation device for this normal form game and
then study the normal form, symmetric correlated equilibrium.
Nash equilibria in a strategic market game converge to competitive equilibria
of the associated economy – Dubey and Shubik (1978); this is the case in our
set up as well. Convergence fails in Cordella and Datta (2002), which is, still, a
conundrum.
discussed rationalizable sunspots in such a setup. Cordella and Datta (2002) characterized
and compared competitive (Walras) and strategic (Cournot-Nash) stationary equilibria.
3It is now well understood that the fundamental features of competitive equilibria in
economies of overlapping generations derive from the double inﬁnity of individuals and com-
modities and not from the temporal structure – Geanakoplos (1987) and Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1991).
3We show that
1. there is a natural parallel between stationary Markov correlated equilib-
ria in a market game and stationary Markov equilibria with sunspots in
the associated competitive economy, and any diﬀerences vanishes as the
economy gets large;
2. the lower is the degree of competition, the larger is the range of parameters
that allow for eﬀective correlation.
Further work should consider general settings.
2 The Set up
Types of individuals are t =0 ,1,..., and individuals of each type are i =
1,...,n; an individual is, thus, (i,t) or simply t, w h e no n l yt h et y p eo ft h e
individual matters.
Commodities are τ =1 ,....
Individuals of type t 6=0 , are endowed with and derive utility from the
consumption of commodities τ = t and τ =( t +1 ) .
The consumption of an individual is a bundle, (xt,yt), of commodities τ = t
and τ =( t +1 ) , respectively.
The economy is stationary: an individual derives utility from consumption
according to the (intertemporal) von Neumann - Morgenstern utility function
w(x,y)=u(x)+v(y), (x,y) ≥ 0,
and his endowment of commodities τ = t and τ =( t +1 )is
ω =( e,f) ≥ 0.
Individuals of type t =0 , are endowed with and derive utility from the
consumption of commodity τ =1 .
Such an economy in which there are exactly n(≥ 2) individuals of each type,
is denoted by En.
42.1 A strategic market game
Agents are (strategic) players in the game and can inﬂuence the prices of the
commodities by their buy and sell orders.




with the interpretation that qi
t is the quantity of commodity τ = t that the
individual oﬀers in exchange for commodity τ = t +1 .
Individuals of type t =0make no strategic choices.
Ap r o ﬁle of strategies   q =( qi
t) determines the aggregate supply and, as a









The allocation of commodities to an individual of type t 6=0associated with
ap r o ﬁle of strategies is
xi,t = e − qi





and his utility or payoﬀ is






This is the formulation of Shapley (1976) and Shapley and Shubik (1977).
The aggregate consumption of individuals of type t =0is Q1.
2.2 The associated competitive economy
Prices of commodities are
p =( p1,...,p τ,...) ≥ 0.
The budget constraint of an individual of type t 6=0is
xi,t = e − qi





5The individual demands or supplies commodities in order to maximize his
utility subject to the budget constraint.
Individuals of type t =0consume Q1, the aggregate supply of the commod-
ity.
The interpretation and the analogy with the model of overlapping gener-
ations are evident: commodities are exchanged for ﬁat money, a medium of
exchange, in ﬁxed supply normalized to 1; exchange of commodities for bal-
ances occurs sequentially according to τ; the supply of balances complements
the endowment of individuals of type t =0 .
2.3 Equilibria: correlation and sunspots
A state of the world is   s =( st;t 6=0 ) , with st ∈ {a,b}. The information partition
of individuals t 6=0is
Pt = {Pt
a = {  s : st = a},Pt
b = {  s : st = b}};
individuals t =0are uninformed, which is immaterial, since they make no
strategic decisions.
Probability distributions over states of the world are generated by the sta-



















With perfect serial correlation, π(a|a)=π(b|b)=1or π(a)=π(b)=1 .
With serial independence, π(a|a)=π(a|b) and π(b|b)=π(b|a) or π(a)+
π(b)=1 .
This describes the correlation device.
A strategy of an individual, t 6=0 , is a pair {qt(a),q t(b)} : the quantity
supplied by the individual as a function of the information he receives.
A symmetric, stationary, Markov, correlated equilibrium for the strategic
market game is described by transition probabilities and strategies, {π(a),π(b),
6q(a),q(b)}, such that
q(s) = argmax
q Es0|s u(e − q)+v(f + q
p(q +( n − 1)q(s))
p(s0)
),s , s 0 ∈ {a,b},
where, the stationary structure allows us to denote st and st+1, by s and s0,
respectively.
This is a symmetric, stationary, Markov Nash equilibrium of the game ex-
tended by the correlation device, as in Aumann (1974, 1987).
For the associated economy, a stationary, Markov, competitive equilibrium
with sunspots is described by transition probabilities, prices of commodities and
quantities supplied, {π(a),π (b),p(a),p(b),q(a),q(b)}, such that
q(s) = argmax
q Es0|s u(e − q)+v(f + q
p(s)
p(s0)
),s , s 0 ∈ {a,b}.
This is the formulation of Azariadis (1981).
As n →∞ , the optimal responses of the agents in the correlated equilibrium
of the strategic market game converge to those in the competitive equilibria
with sunspots in the associated economy.
3R e s u l t s
We restrict attention to interior values: 0 <q (a),q(b) <e ,as standard restric-
tions on preferences and endowments allow; also, to non-degenerate probability
distributions: 0 <π (a),π(b) < 1.
Lemma 1 A correlated equilibrium for the strategic market game, {π(a),π(b),
q(a),q(b)}, is a solution to the system of equations
u0(e − q(a)) = n−1
n (π(a)v0(f + q(a)) + (1 − π(a))v0(f + q(b))
q(b)
q(a)),
u0(e − q(b)) = n−1
n (π(b)v0(f + q(b)) + (1 − π(b))v0(f + q(a))
q(a)
q(b)).
A sunspot equilibrium for the associated competitive economy, {π(a),π(b),
7p(a),p(b),q(a),q(b)}, is a solution to the system of equations
u0(e − q(a)) = π(a)v0(f + q(a)) + (1 − π(a))v0(f + q(b))
q(b)
q(a),
u0(e − q(b)=π(b)v0(f + q(b)) + (1 − π(b))v0(f + q(a))
q(a)
q(b).
Proof. For the strategic market game, the result follows from the deﬁnition
of a correlated equilibrium and the necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst order conditions
for strategies mutual optimal responses.
For the associated competitive economy, the result follows from the deﬁnition
of a equilibrium and the necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst order conditions for utility
maximization subject to the budget constraint.
As the number of individuals in each type or generation, n, increases, corre-
lated equilibria of the strategic market game coincide with sunspot equilibria of
the associated economy. This is an application of the argument in Dubey and
Shubik (1978), without reference to no-trade equilibria that arise naturally in
market games irrespective of the size of the market.
















Following Cass and Shell (1985), “extrinsic uncertainty is eﬀective”or sun-
spots do matter, at a competitive equilibrium, if q(a) 6= q(b); extrinsic uncer-
tainty is eﬀective if it is eﬀective at some competitive equilibrium. Similarly, we
shall say that correlation is eﬀective, at a correlated equilibrium, if q(a) 6= q(b);
correlation is eﬀective if it is eﬀective at some correlated equilibrium.
8A correlated equilibrium where q(a)=q(b)=q∗
n and, as a consequence,





and it is the symmetric, stationary, interior Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
of the normal form market game in discussion.
Similarly, a competitive equilibrium where q(a)=q(b)=q∗ and, as a conse-
quence, sunspots are ineﬀective, exists: it obtains as the solution to the equation
u0(e − q)=v0(f + q),
and it is the stationary equilibrium of the associated competitive economy.
The existence of correlated equilibria with eﬀective correlation depends on
the curvature of the cardinal utility indices of individuals; equivalently, the slope
of the supply of savings with respect to ther a t eo fi n t e r e s to rt h er e l a t i v er i s k
aversion of individuals over (net) second period consumption.
If at q∗, the (Nash) equilibrium, v00(f + q∗)q∗ + v0(f + q∗) < 0(> 0), then,
savings is an decreasing (increasing) function of the interest factor, pt/pt+1, and
relative risk aversion over (net) second period consumption is higher (lower)
than 1.
Simple characterizations obtain if the sign of the expression v00(f + q)q +
v0(f + q) does not vary with q>0; the argument is as in Azariadis (1981).
Lemma 2 If
v00(f + q)q + v0(f + q) > 0,
then correlation is ineﬀective.
Proof. By the hypothesis, the function v0(f + q)q is strictly monotonically
increasing, as is, by concavity, the function u0(e − q)q.
We argue by contradiction:
Without loss of generality, q(a) <q (b), and, as a consequence, v0(f +
q(a))q(a) <v 0(f + q(b))q(b).S i n c e π(a) < 1, from the expressions in Corol-
lary 1, (n/(n−1))u0(e−q(a)) >v 0(f +q(a)), and, as a consequence, q(a) >q ∗
n.
9Since π(b) < 1, similarly, q(b) <q ∗
n. It follows that q(b) <q (a), a contradiction.
Lemma 3 With
v00(f + q)q + v0(f + q) < 0,
at a correlated equilibrium with π(a)+π(b) ≥ 1, correlation is ineﬀective.
Proof. By the hypothesis, the function v0(f + q)q is strictly monotoni-
cally decreasing, while, from concavity, the function u0(e−q)q is monotonically
increasing.
We suppose that π(a)+π(b) ≥ 1 and argue by contradiction:
Without loss of generality, q(a) <q (b), and, as a consequence, v0(f +
q(a))q(a) >v 0(f + q(b))q(b).
With π(a) ≥ (1 − π(b)), it follows from the expressions for π(a) and π(b)
in Corollary 1, that u0(e − q(a)) ≥ u0(e − q(b)), and, therefore, q(a) ≥ q(b),a
contradiction.
Importantly, if the conditions necessary for eﬀective correlation are satisﬁed,
π(a)+π(b) < 1, which excludes signals that are serially independent.
Lemma 4 With
v00(f + q)q + v0(f + q) < 0,









u0(e − ˆ q)ˆ q
or, equivalently,
−(v00(f +ˆ q)ˆ q + v0(f +ˆ q)) > −
n
n − 1
u00(f − ˆ q)+u0(f − ˆ q),
at some ˆ q>0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, q(a) <q (b), and, as a consequence,
v0(f + q(a))q(a) >v 0(f + q(b))q(b).
10Then, 0 <π (a),π(b) < 1 if and only if
v0(f + q(b))q(b) < n
n−1u0(e − q(a))q(a) <v 0(f + q(a))q(a),
v0(f + q(b))q(b) < n
n−1u0(e − q(b))q(b) <v 0(f + q(a))q(a)
or, equivalently,
v0(f + q(b))q(b) < n
n−1u0(e − q(a))q(a),
n
n−1u0(e − q(b))q(b) <v 0(f + q(a))q(a).
These inequalities can be satisﬁed simultaneously only if, somewhere in their




v00(f + q)q + v0(f + q) < 0,
if

















−(v00(f + q)q + v0(f + q)) > −
n
n − 1
u00(f − q)+u0(f − q),
then correlation is eﬀective.
Proof. It suﬃces to set q(a)=q and q(b)=q.
Corollary 2 If correlation is eﬀective at equilibrium with some 0 <q< q
satisfying the hypothesis in Theorem 1, for some n, then correlation is eﬀective
at equilibrium for all economies with n ≥ n.
11Proof. As n increases, ((n − 1)/n) increases or, equivalently, (n/(n − 1))
decreases to 1.I fq < q satisﬁes the hypothesis in the Theorem 1 for n,t h e ni t
does so for all n ≥ n.
From the theorem, it is clear that the degree of competition, ((n − 1)/n),
enhances the possibility of eﬀective correlation: an increase in n, may allow for
eﬀective correlation.
The following parametric example illustrates the point.
Example 1 Take
w(x,y)=u(x)+v(y)=−x−k − x−2k, 1 ≤ k ≤ 8,
and
ω =( e,f)=( 1 0 ,2).
For k =1or k =2 , q(α)=1and q(β)=2is an equilibrium for any value
of n.
For k =3 , q(α)=1and q(β)=2is an equilibrium only for n>2.
Theorem 2 With
























n + u0(f − q∗
n),
then correlation is eﬀective.
Corollary 3 If q∗
n satisﬁe st h eh y p o t h e s i si nT h e o r e m2i na ne c o n o m yEn,
and thereby correlation is eﬀective at equilibrium, then correlation is eﬀective at
equilibrium for all economies En0, n0 >n .
T h ed e g r e eo fc o m p e t i t i o n ,((n − 1)/n), acts as a discount factor for second
period consumption, and, as such, it aﬀects the possibility of eﬀective correla-
tion.
12Since the cardinal utility indices for ﬁrst and second period consumption
need not coincide, there is no meaning to the numeric value of a discount factor.
More importantly, the eﬀect of a discount factor or of the degree of compe-
tition is secondary, since it does not aﬀect directly the curvature of the utility
index.







ω =( e,f)=( 1 ,0).













n + v0(f + q∗
n)) > − n
n−1u00(f − q∗
n)q∗




independently of the degree of competition or the discount factor.
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